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Abstract 
While bringing positive impacts and benefits, cross-border infrastructure projects face 
additional challenges relative to national projects. Moreover, such projects involve a variety 
of technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal factors, and their obstacles constrain the 
development of cross-border infrastructure projects. This paper argues that proper technical 
specifications and well-functioning regulatory, institutional and legislative/legal frameworks 
with clearer lines of oversight are crucial to getting such projects off the ground in the first 
place and to ensure that they operate properly and reliably while minimizing their 
environmental impacts. It is pointed out that many issues in theses areas need to be 
addressed at the national level. The paper concludes that such domestic efforts, coupled 
with regional frameworks and arrangements wherever necessary, will promote the further 
development of cross-border infrastructure projects. 
JEL Classification: O13; Q01; Q43; Q48; Q53; Q54; Q56; Q58; R48 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border infrastructure investment projects can bring many positive impacts, primarily by 
supporting the integration of national economies, creating economies of scale, and 
promoting trade, economic growth, and poverty reduction. These kinds of impacts can be 
significant for land-locked, low-trade, and resource-poor countries. However, cross-border 
infrastructure projects also hold the potential to negatively impact affected parties, for 
example, by displacing communities inhabiting proposed investment sites and causing 
environmental degradation. Cross-border routes, in particular those that open up remote 
areas, can also become conduits for communicable diseases and the trafficking of people 
and drugs. 
This study will limit its consideration of infrastructure projects to those that lie within two main 
economic sectors, namely, energy (power and natural gas) and transport. Cross-border 
energy infrastructure projects are essentially cost-reducing investments which aim to secure 
energy supplies at a lower cost than domestic alternatives. Cross-border transport 
infrastructure projects have the potential to be both cost-reducing and trade-creating 
because they help to both cut transport costs and enlarge markets beyond national 
boundaries. 
Energy infrastructure projects, in particular the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Power Project 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Northeast Asia (NEA) Power 
Grid interconnection projects, cut the costs of delivering power by: 
z  exploiting the low-cost hydroelectric power potential of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR) and the Yunnan Province in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
as well as the low-cost power potential of the Russian Far East; 
z  reducing overall additions to generating capacity by expanding access and minimizing 
reserve capacity needs for peak demand periods; 
z  optimizing economies of scale for both power stations and energy networks; and 
z  taking advantage of dispatching the generation plants of lowest marginal cost as a result 
of expanded access. 
Figure 1 shows the seasonal differences in maximum electricity loads in the Russian Far 
East and the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea). Even though the NEA countries are all 
situated in the northern hemisphere, there are notable differences in climate. As a result, 
electricity demand peaks during the summer in Korea, whereas in winter there is an excess 
of power generating capacity. By contrast, the Russian Far East has a demand peak during 
the winter and faces an excess of power-generating capacity during the summer. Clearly, 
interconnecting power grids between the Russian Far East and Korea would bring about 
substantial benefits by enabling them to share their mutually complementary seasonal 
excess capacities. In other words, mutual benefits can be realized by importing electricity 
produced by inexpensive foreign generators during peak demand times and exporting when 
demand is at a low. Podkovalnikov (2002) has estimated that the proposed Russian Far 
East—Korean interconnection would reduce the demand for generating capacity through 
2020 by 8 gigawatts (GWs), or one quarter of the new capacities to be commissioned if 
power systems continue to be separately operated. As a result, while the interconnection 
itself is expected to cost around US$2 billion, it would reduce expenditures on new 
generating capacity by about US$14.3 billion, leading to an overall capital cost saving of 
about US$12.3 billion. Annualizing this capital cost saving at a discount rate of 8% and 
adding in operating savings leads to estimated total cost savings from the proposed 
interconnection of around US$2 billion per year.    
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The Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline (TAGP) was proposed in the ASEAN Vision 2020 as a 
means of linking natural gas production centers with markets in neighboring countries 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] 1997). The TAGP proposal recognizes 
natural gas’s superior qualities as a fuel source and is designed to catalyze cross-border 
linkages to connect national gas grids and cut energy costs by: 
z  providing a cheaper, cleaner, and more efficient alternative to traditionally used diesel-
fired plants; 
z  encouraging price competition among suppliers; and 
z  promoting the potential development of stranded gas fields whose small sizes do not 
currently justify production. 
Cross-border energy projects like the TAGP or the Nam Theun 2 not only cut the cost of 
energy supplies, they also provide local and global environmental benefits by reducing local 
pollutants and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through the use of hydropower and/or 
natural gas in place of coal and/or oil. Cross-border transport (highway) projects cut vehicle 
operating costs and improve traffic safety, while increasing the passage of goods across 
borders. In addition to these measurable economic and environmental benefits, intangible 
benefits such as the strengthening of energy security and the promotion of regional 
economic cooperation with neighboring countries may well be generated from cross-border 
energy and transport projects. When a cross-border project has components in several 
countries, and when each component is viable in its own right, the project’s overall viability 
will only be increased when regional benefits are taken into account. 
Despite their great positive potential, cross-border projects pose additional challenges as 
compared to national projects. For example, technological problems could arise due to 
differences in the standard and quality of power across countries, or the existence of 
differing frequencies and voltages. There can also be increased concern about the reliability 
of interconnected power grids, especially as their malfunctioning may lead to costly and 
hazardous blackouts. Moreover, because a cross-border project has components in more 
than one country, the issue of the sustainability of each country’s component(s) over time 
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can be of great concern. For example, with regard to a cross-border highway project, it may 
be the case that one country’s infrastructure degrades much more rapidly than its partner’s 
due to less strict adherence to load limits and inadequate levels of expenditure for road 
maintenance. 
Cross-border projects, in particular energy projects, often turn out to be large scale and 
highly capital intensive. The likelihood of a, say, cross-border energy project going ahead will 
depend on such determining factors as: 
z  the cost difference between the proposed new power supply and other energy 
alternatives; 
z  progress in regional transmission systems and power and gas grids; 
z  the development of competing power plans in other neighboring countries; 
z  arrangements for access and use; and 
z  the legal framework for investments, etc. 
The range of considerations listed above illustrate that cross-border infrastructure projects 
involve a variety of technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal factors. Getting these factors 
right at the national level and/or, wherever necessary, at the regional level is crucial to 
getting such projects off the ground, in the first instance, and then to ensuring that projects 
operate properly and reliably while managing and minimizing their environmental impacts. 
The next section of this paper will focus on identifying the potentially negative environmental 
impacts of cross-border infrastructure projects in Asia, looking predominantly at the energy 
sector but also at the transport sector. These impacts will be identified at the project level 
and, wherever necessary, beyond the project level. Section 3 then looks at how the adverse 
impacts identified in Section 2 can be reduced to a minimum or acceptable level, during the 
project’s planning, design, and construction stages. Given the fact that cross-border projects 
face specific additional challenges relative to national projects, and given that technical, 
regulatory, institutional, and legal obstacles can constrain the development of cross-border 
infrastructure projects, the paper argues that proper technical specifications and well-
functioning regulatory, institutional, and legislative/legal frameworks with clear lines of 
responsibility for oversight institutions are crucial to the development of cross-border 
infrastructure projects. It will be seen that many issues in these areas need to be addressed 
at the national level. Such domestic efforts, coupled with regional frameworks and 
arrangements, wherever necessary, will promote the further development of cross-border 
infrastructure projects. Finally, the paper calls for a strengthened role for multilateral 
development banks, like the Asian Development Bank, in supporting positive environmental 
outcomes in cross-border infrastructure projects. 
2.  ANTICIPATED ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS DURING 
PROJECT PREPARATION 
The construction of any project will directly impact the surrounding environment, as well as 
have potential climatic impacts. Furthermore, some of the environmental impacts will only 
become known after a project becomes operational. Project managers, therefore, need to 
anticipate the project’s environmental impacts in the preparatory stage, as well as be ready 
to respond to environmental effects during the project’s operation. Depending on its scale, 
type, and location, a cross-border infrastructure project can have environmental impacts that 
extend beyond the project level and into the national, subregional, or even global level. This 
section will look at four cross-border infrastructure projects that have been proposed for or 
undertaken in Asia—three energy-based and one transport-based—and discuss both 
project-level impacts and anticipated impacts beyond the project level, based on the current 
available information. 
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2.1  Environmental Impacts at the Project Level 
The type and extent of a project’s potential environmental impacts are highly context-specific 
and depend on factors such as topography, land use, vegetation cover, and settlement 
patterns. 
2.1.1  The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (Lao PDR) 
The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR will dam the Nam Theun River, 
creating a reservoir and generating power. The key environmental impacts from this project 
will be upon the physical and biological environments and will affect hydrology, water quality, 
erosion rates, climate, groundwater, aquatic and terrestrial habitats, species diversity, 
protected areas, and local endangered species. Hydrology impacts include the impoundment 
of the Nam Theun River, the diversion of water, and changes in river flow. Water quality 
impacts include low dissolved oxygen concentrations, increased nutrient concentrations in 
the initial years, wastewater discharges from construction sites and work camps, and 
sedimentation from construction sites. Erosion and sedimentation impacts include changes 
in sedimentation both in the reservoir and downstream, and changes in riverbank erosion. 
Impacts on aquatic species include alteration of habitats and the associated disfavoring of 
certain species, imposed barriers to migration, alterations in species composition and 
productivity of the river, and damage due to sedimentation. Terrestrial biodiversity impacts 
include effects on land and vegetation, including loss of land to the reservoir and increased 
human access to area including habitation. Other impacts include the generation of minor 
micro-climatic changes on the plateau and effects on endangered species. Mitigation 
measures for these various impacts have been formulated (Norplan 2004).  
The Nam Theun 2 Project also involves the construction and operation of a 138 kilometer 
(km) long, 500 kilovolt (kV) double circuit transmission line to transmit power from the Lao 
PDR to Thailand. The primary impacts associated with this component of the project are 
land use change and vegetation loss. The transmission line will require a 60 meter (m) wide 
right of way (ROW) along its 165 km length, amounting to 9.7 square kilometers (km
2) of 
land. Further, the construction of around 300 transmission line towers will require the 
permanent acquisition of 12 hectares (ha) of the ROW land (Asian Development Bank [ADB] 
2004). While only the land under towers is permanently acquired, land use restrictions will be 
placed on all land within the ROW. Vegetation will be restricted to a 3 m height, while no 
structure over 3 m in height will be permitted to be constructed within the easement. This will 
reduce the agricultural capacity of the land in rural areas by prohibiting the cultivation of 
most trees in the ROW, and restrict construction possibilities on urban or industrial lands. 
Restrictions to tree height will also be applied immediately outside the ROW.  
2.1.2  Transmission Line Project from Tai Ninh, Viet Nam to Kampong Cham, 
Cambodia 
The proposed 115 kV transmission lines from the Viet Nam border to Kampong Cham, 
Cambodia will have similar effects on land use and vegetation as those outlined for the Nam 
Theun 2 project, although to a lesser extent as only 1.74 ha of land needs to be acquired to 
construct the transmission line towers and poles and three substations (Korea Electric 
Power Corporation 2007). 
2.1.3  Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway Project 
This highway project connects Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh City and is part of a longer 
corridor between Bangkok, Thailand, and the southern Vietnamese port city of Vung Tau. 
The 240 km road, with 160 km in Cambodia and 80 km in Viet Nam, was reconstructed to 
meet the expected increase in traffic flows as trade between the two countries increases. As 
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the first road project under its Greater Mekong Subregion
1(GMS) initiative, ADB provided 
US$40 million for the Cambodian portion (ADB Loan No. 1659-CAM) and US$100 million for 
the Viet Nam section (ADB Loan No. 1660-VIE) (ADB 1998). The project involved the 
rehabilitation of an existing road and the project road aligns with the pre-existing road for 
most of its length,  with minor realignments made at some locations to improve safety and to 
minimize the need for land acquisition and resettlement. In Cambodia, one section was 
realigned to bypass a built-up area and the statutory ROW was reduced from the 18 m from 
the road centerline identified at the project appraisal stage to 10–15 m, resulting in a 
reduction in the number of project-affected households from 1184 to 1086 (ADB 2007b). 
There were no environmentally sensitive areas along the length of the project road. The 
initial environmental assessments undertaken concluded that the potential environmental 
impacts during the construction and operation of the project would be minor (ADB 1998; 
ADB 2007b). Although no specific level of reduction in vehicle operating costs was set, it has 
been conservatively estimated that the upgraded road has reduced operating costs by 10% 
for passenger cars and by 15% for trucks and buses (ADB 2007b). 
2.2  Environmental Impacts Beyond the Immediate Project Study 
Area 
A project can have impacts beyond its immediate project study area, but these impacts can 
only be revealed if the scope of study is extended accordingly. Therefore, a cumulative 
impact assessment (CIA) needs to be undertaken to study the combined impacts of the 
project under study and other development projects, whether they are to be implemented 
together or sequentially. This is a unique aspect of the environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) of cross-border infrastructure projects. The CIA studies: 
added impacts—the impacts that other (concurrent or future) development projects have on 
the type and magnitude of the proposed project; and 
induced impacts—the impacts of developments in other sectors that have been induced by 
the proposed project.  
2.2.1  The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR 
A CIA was undertaken in relation to the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project to analyze the 
combined impacts of a raft of projects, both concurrent and sequential, and of future 
developments and plans. The geographic coverage of the CIA included the Mekong River 
Basin; the Nam Theun/Nam Kading, Xe Bang Fai, and Hinboun basins; and the linear 
development zone of transmission lines and roads. In addition, border areas were assessed 
in terms of social development, transport, and biodiversity. Two development scenarios were 
assessed, based on five-year and twenty-year planning horizons. These scenarios covered 
several sectors and examined the present situation, existing plans, and development trends. 
The elements covered were: hydropower, transport, irrigation, water supply and sanitation, 
urban development, fisheries, forestry, industry, social development (including ethnic 
minorities, health, education, and social inequality), and conservation (biodiversity issues). 
Of all these elements, hydropower is the most planned and has the greatest potential to 
affect the whole Mekong Basin in terms of active (seasonal) storage of water. This will result 
in increased dry-season and decreased wet-season flows. Table 1 presents a preliminary 
summary of the anticipated cumulative impacts of the Nam Theun 2 Project on the Nakai 
plateau (the project area) and the Mekong River Basin, when combined with the anticipated 
developments in the other sectors listed above over five-year and twenty-year planning 
horizons. 
                                                  
1 The Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) comprises Cambodia, the PRC, the Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam. 
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Table 1: Cumulative Impacts of Anticipated Regional Developments including the Nam 
Theun 2 Project 
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The dominant factor will be some additional 
development of hydropower in Yunnan (PRC) 
and the Lao PDR. The impacts are calculated 
to be: 
(i)  dry-season discharge at Savannakhet may 
increase by 45%. During floods, discharge 
reduced by 7%; 
(ii)  water levels at Phnom Penh will be lower 
during floods and increased during the dry 
season. Average annual maximum level of 
the Tonle Sap lake and river system will 
also be reduced; 
(iii)  changes in flow pattern will have an 
insignificant negative impact on floodplain 
and Tonle Sap fisheries as these are 
favored by high wet-season water levels; 
(iv)  changes in flow pattern will, however, have 
a small positive impact by damping 
damaging flood incidents and by 
increasing dry-season water level which 
will support irrigation and reduce salt 
intrusion into the Mekong delta. 
 
The situation is stabilized but significantly 
changed from the current baseline. Transport 
and communications will be significantly 
improved and new activities will have been 
attracted to the reservoir area (e.g., commercial 
fisheries and tourism). The anticipated situation 
is: 
(i)  sanitation and water supply improved; 
(ii)  Oudomsouk population higher than during 
the project construction period by some 
140–150%; 
(iii)  commercial fisheries established; 
(iv)  health conditions improved with reduced 
incidence of malaria and food- and water-
borne diseases, and shift from 
communicable toward non-communicable 
diseases; 
(v)  heath and education services improved 
but struggling to keep up with demand due 
to population increase; 
(vi)  increased employment in service sector 
including tourism; and 
(vii)  increased cultural integration on the 
plateau with blurring of ethnic identities. 
The dominant impact will be further 
development of hydropower in Yunnan (PRC) 
and the Lao PDR. Impacts are calculated to be: 
(i)  dry-season discharge at Savannakhet 
may increase by 135%. During floods, 
discharges may reduce by 22%. 
(ii)  water levels at Phnom Penh will be 
lowered further during floods and 
increased further during the dry season. 
Average annual maximum level of Tonle 
Sap will be further reduced; 
(iii)  changes in flow pattern will have a 
significant negative impact on the 
floodplain and Tonle Sap fisheries; and 
(iv)  changes in flow patterns will, however, 
have a significant positive impact by 
damping damaging flood incidents and by 
increasing dry-season water levels that 
will support irrigation and reduce salt 
intrusion into the Mekong delta. 
Notes: HIV/AIDS = human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
Source: Nam Theun 2 Power Company, Cumulative Impact Analysis and Nam Theun 2 Contribution, Final Report, 
November 2004 (cited in ADB 2004). 
The CIA also examined the specific contribution of the Nam Theun 2 Project to the 
downstream changes in the Mekong River. The Nam Theun 2 Project alone is predicted to 
result in an increase of about 8% in dry-season discharge at Savannakhet while reducing 
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flood discharges by 2%. The Nam Theun 2 reservoir is also expected to cause only a 
minimum retention of sediments. The CIA concluded that the Nam Theun 2 Project alone will 
have an insignificant
2 negative impact on the Mekong floodplain and on all aspects of the 
Tonle Sap lake and river system, including fish production (ADB 2004). 
2.2.2  The Papua New Guinea Gas Project
3 
The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Gas Project was proposed to develop existing oil and gas 
production fields in the PNG Highlands to produce natural gas for export to Australia by 
pipeline. Of the range of existing and possible future activities arising from this project, those 
with the greatest potential for cumulative environmental impacts were commercial forestry, 
enhanced population mobility, and the hunting of fauna and collection of flora. Agricultural 
development was constrained by various factors, and other forms of development (such as 
fisheries, tourism, and mining) seemed unlikely to be extensive in scope. On the hunting of 
fauna and collection of flora, the improved public road system associated with the project 
would enable poachers to use vehicles to travel further afield to poach wildlife. Close 
supervision by any related government agency will be difficult because of the remoteness of 
the area. Thus, mitigation measures that can respond to this problem needed to be explored. 
Measures would also be implemented (during project operations) to limit the impact on 
biodiversity caused by project workers in project-managed areas, for example, the institution 
of policies and prohibitions related to wildlife disturbance and harassment, hunting, and 
vegetation gardening, etc. Involving landowners in the supervision of road sections was one 
possible approach to managing this issue. Restrictions on carrying guns for hunting also 
needed to be considered (Esso Highlands Ltd. 2006). 
2.3  Sector-Wide and Economy-Wide Environmental Impacts 
A project can be very large relative to a sector and/or economy. In the case of a small 
economy, implementation of a large project may have sector-wide and/or economy-wide 
implications. Therefore, a strategic impact assessment (SIA) needs to be undertaken to 
identify potential impacts at the sector- and/or economy-wide level, as well as the options 
available to avoid the impacts identified. An SIA integrates environmental issues with 
economic and sectoral policies at the planning stage, rather than at the implementation 
stage, and is thus a useful tool to bridge the policy divide that separates the government 
institutions responsible for economic planning from the line industries in charge of 
environmental protection at the planning stage of any development activity (Zhang 2008). 
2.3.1  The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR 
In recognition of the fact that this is a large project which may have sector-wide implications, 
an SIA was undertaken to examine the broader issues faced by hydropower development in 
the Lao PDR and to develop strategic priorities for use by government institutions, donors, 
private investors, and other stakeholders to improve the management of environmental and 
social issues within the sector. Specifically, the SIA reviewed the planning, legal, regulatory, 
and institutional frameworks in the Lao PDR, estimated the environmental and social 
                                                  
2 Significance is based on whether or not the induced impacts of Nam Theun 2 are within the range of normal 
fluctuation. 
3 ExxonMobil and its partners have abandoned the concept of a pipeline for exporting natural gas to Australia 
due to low relative benefits and sharply higher construction costs. They are now pursuing the concept of 
producing LNG to export natural gas internationally, targeted principally to Asian markets. In comparison with the 
total value of output estimated at US$14 billion–US$23 billion (in 2006 US$) attributed to the Papua New Guinea 
Gas Project (Esso Highlands Ltd. 2006), the total value of output for the LNG project is estimated at US$55 
billion–US$123 billion (in 2007 US$), with US$95 billion in the study case (ACIL Tasman Ltd. 2008). Despite this, 
the Papua New Guinea Gas Project is still cited in this paper because it exemplifies how a variety of issues need 
to be addressed in the project design stage. The author of the paper is grateful to Barry Reid who provided the 
reports for the two projects.  
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impacts of the other 21 hydropower projects that, based on plans, are the most likely to be 
built in the next 15 years, and identified, at the sector level, the numerous strategic 
opportunities available to avoid impacts and improve environmental and social management 
(Norplan 2004; ADB 2004). 
2.4  Climate Adaptation and Mitigation 
Cross-border infrastructure projects may lead to changes in land use, forest and vegetation 
coverage, ecosystems and biodiversity spots, and relocation of human settlements, etc. 
These changes may put the affected regions, in particular those already vulnerable to 
climate change, at great risk, and affect their abilities to adapt to climate change and 
maintain carbon sinks. On the positive side, some cross-border energy projects will enable 
existing energy consumers to use hydropower and/or natural gas in place of coal and/or oil. 
This will benefit the environment, both locally and globally, by reducing local pollutants (e.g., 
emissions of sulfur dioxide [SO2] and nitrogen oxide [NOx]) and global pollutants (e.g., 
emissions of carbon dioxide [CO2] and other greenhouse gases [GHGs]). However, because 
climate issues have not been at the top of the agenda in this region, very few cross-border 
infrastructure projects have to date factored climate adaptation and mitigation into overall 
considerations. When these issues have been considered, they have not been done so in 
detail.  
Because current developments will set the patterns for energy and transport use in this 
region, and will have a lasting effect on climate change, there is a great need to thoroughly 
document both the negative implications for climate change that arise from cross-border 
infrastructure projects and the potential climate benefits that these projects can bring in 
terms of reduced GHGs and the maintenance of carbon sinks (for example, through the 
preservation of land and forest coverage). However, it should be pointed out that while it is 
relatively easy to calculate the reduced GHG emissions that will result from replacing the 
existing use of coal and/or oil with cross-border hydropower and/or natural gas, it is very 
difficult to estimate other climate impacts, such as the impact on carbon sinks, particularly 
when a project involves huge changes in land use, forest and vegetation coverage, 
ecosystems and biodiversity spots, and relocation of human settlements, etc. 
2.4.1  The Papua New Guinea Gas Project 
The gas supplied by this project to consumers in Australia would enable existing energy 
users to transfer to clean-burning natural gas and away from carbon-intensive fuels such as 
coal. The significant GHGs that were released during the combustion of natural gas were 
CO2 and nitrogen dioxide (NO2). It had been estimated that the GHG emissions avoided 
would be around 1 million tons of CO2 (Mt CO2) equivalent
4 per year for the first two years of 
gas supply. The avoided GHG emissions would peak at 4 Mt CO2 equivalent in 2015, and 
remained at around 2 Mt CO2 equivalent throughout the remainder of the life of the project. 
However, the overall GHG emissions would be 0.90% higher in 2020 under the “with-project 
scenario” because of demand creation by new projects, while total GHG emissions would be 
1.05% less as a result of the greater proportion of natural gas in the fuel mix (Esso 
Highlands Ltd. 2006). 
3.  MITIGATION MEASURES 
Adverse impacts need to be avoided wherever possible. In the cases where adverse impacts 
can not be completely avoided, ways need to be found to reduce impacts to a minimum or 
acceptable level. Possibilities include: comparing the proposed project with alternative 
                                                  
4 CO2 equivalent describes how much global warning a given type and amount of GHG may cause, using the 
functionally equivalent amount or concentration of CO2 as the reference. 
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options to determine whether the proposed option is indeed the most attractive; carefully 
selecting project sites and routes; reducing the number of camp followers; developing and 
implementing proper contract awarding systems; specifying the green credentials required of 
head construction contractors; and engaging project-affected people and communities and 
other concerned stakeholders in public consultation and disclosure processes during the 
project design stage. Based on the information available for three proposed and completed 
cross-border infrastructure projects, this section will discuss, to the extent possible, whether 
these projects have taken the available mitigation options into account during the project 
design stage. 
3.1  A Study of Alternatives to the Proposed Project 
An assessment of the EIAs for three completed projects in the Lao PDR (Theun Hinboun, 
Houay Ho, and Nam Leuk) revealed that crucial information and analyses were only 
available after construction had started on the projects. As a consequence, project design 
and operations could not be modified in advance to mitigate environmental impacts (Norplan 
2004). This experience demonstrates that carefully studying alternatives to the project at the 
project design stage, and making corresponding modifications wherever needed, can act as 
an important measure to help mitigate the negative impacts of the proposed project. 
A study of alternatives is undertaken to determine whether the proposed project is indeed 
the most attractive of the available options. This involves first determining how the project in 
question compares with alternative options (including a without-the-proposed-project 
alternative) for achieving the same goal, as measured against technical, economic, financial, 
environmental, and social criteria. If the proposed project is confirmed as the superior option, 
then the project configuration should be examined to ensure that it is optimal. This requires 
considering alternative configurations of the project, particularly with respect to those 
parameters that are critical to the overall environmental and social impacts. If the proposed 
configuration is determined to be optimal, then the proposed project is indeed the most 
attractive option. 
3.1.1  Without-Project Option 
There are two criteria for assessing the without-project option for any proposed project: i) the 
strategic opportunity costs, and ii) the impacts avoided and benefits foregone. 
3.1.1.1  The Papua New Guinea Gas Project 
There were two strategic opportunity costs associated with the without-project option for this 
project. The first was the failure to take advantage of the synergies inherent in the existing oil 
and gas infrastructure and the second was the loss of future opportunities to build on the 
project’s infrastructure to develop new fields. With regard to the second opportunity cost, the 
foreclosed future development options included: i) potential value-adding, gas-based 
industries—such as methanol, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and compressed natural gas 
(CNG) production—would have no supply source, and ii) undeveloped gas and condensate 
fields to the northwest of existing production operations would not be able to exploit 
production synergies with the proposed project. Instead, they would have to face the more 
difficult commercial hurdle of stand-alone development, with a correspondingly reduced 
chance of meeting investment criteria. 
In quantitative terms, the without-project option would forego the following: i) net present 
value to Papua New Guinea of US$3 billion–US$4 billion over about 30 years from first gas; 
ii) direct employment from construction peaking at 2,500 jobs (the employment generated 
from combined oil and gas operations, including contract service providers, would be similar 
to that for construction, with the number of permanent direct operations positions estimated 
to be around 2,400); iii) net cash flow to the Government and project area landowners of 
between US$3.2 billion–US$5.6 billion over a 30-year period from first gas— compared to 
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US$1.7 billion from 2009 to the projected end of oil production in 2025; and iv) a substantial 
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP), estimated to peak at 9% some 12 years after 
first gas (Esso Highlands Ltd. 2006). 
3.1.1.2  The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR 
For the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR, the consequences of adopting a 
without-project option would be: 
z  continued low GDP rates and high poverty levels in the Lao PDR; 
z  forgone direct economic benefits, including improvements in infrastructure, health 
services, etc.; and 
z  accelerated exploitation of forests and biodiversity in the Nakai Nam Theun national 
protected area (ADB 2004). 
3.1.1.3  Indonesia-Singapore Gas Pipeline Project 
Construction of the US$420 million pipeline connecting Sumatra and Singapore commenced 
in February 2001 and was completed on 4 August 2003. This 470 km pipeline provided the 
city-state with its third natural gas supply. Without this pipeline project, the traditional fuel of 
diesel would be used to generate the electricity to meet increasing demand. Natural gas was 
introduced for electricity generation in 1992 when Singapore started importing gas from 
Malaysia via pipeline. From 2003 to 2005, the gross efficiency of the power system 
increased by about 5% (Asia Pacific Energy Research Center [APERC] and Institute of 
Energy Economics of Japan [IEEJ] 2007), which would be foregone without the pipeline 
project. Clearly, natural gas-fired power plants provide a cheaper, cleaner, and more efficient 
alternative to the traditionally used oil-fired plants. 
3.1.2  Alternative Options 
3.1.2.1  The Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the Lao PDR 
Both ADB-assisted and World Bank-assisted studies were carried out to examine and 
compare 19 alternatives to the Nam Theun 2 Project, as measured against technical, 
economic, financial, environmental, and social criteria. Both studies ranked the Nam Theun 
2 Hydroelectric Project first in relation to other potential hydropower developments for the 
Lao PDR. Table 2 presents the rankings and characteristics of the 10 highest-ranked 
projects. 
10 ADBI Working Paper 261    Zhang 
 
 
Table 2: Preliminary Rankings and Characteristics of Hydropower Projects for the Lao 
PDR 












1  Nam Theun 2  Storage/transfer 1,074  5,922  1.6 
2 Theun  Hinboun 
Expansion 
Storage/transfer 105  686+  2.4 
3 Thakho  R-of-R/Mekong  30  214  2.6 
4 Nam  Mo  Storage  125  603  2.7 
5  Xe Kaman 3  Storage  250  1,369  2.8 
6  Xe Kaman 1 (u/s 
reg.) 
Storage 470  2,086  3.1 
7  Nam Ngum 2 (u/s 
reg.) 
Storage 460  1,901  3.2 
7a Nam  Ngum  2B  Storage  140  196  8.7 
8  Xe Kong 5  Storage  400  1,795  3.2 
9  Nam Sane 3  Storage  60  283  3.3 
10  Nam Ngiep 1 (+ 
reg. dam) 
Storage 330  1,537  3.8 
Notes: GWh = gigawatt hour, KWh = kilowatt hour, MW = megawatt, p.a. = per annum, reg. = regulating, R-of-R = 
Run-of-River, u/s = upstream. 
a The economic weighted average cost of generation has been calculated using economic, social, and environmental 
evaluation software. It takes into account the economic and financial costs and revenues of developing each scheme, 
weighted against monetary valuations of their environmental and social impacts. It attempts to provide a more 
objective analysis of environmental and social costs and benefits. 
Source: Meritec/Lahmeyer International (2004 preliminary results) Power Sector Development Plan undertaken for 
the World Bank (cited in ADB 2004). 
The study of alternatives also assessed the tradeoffs between the best alternative scenario 
(the second-ranked in Table 2) and the Nam Theun 2 Project. The tradeoffs would be 
US$320 million less income to the Government of the Lao PDR, in exchange for 2430 fewer 
people to be resettled, 286 km
2 less area flooded by reservoirs, and 138 km less river 
inundated (ADB 2004). 
3.1.2.2  The Papua New Guinea Gas Project 
The Papua New Guinea (PNG) Gas Project was initially proposed to build a pipeline to 
export natural gas from the PNG Highlands to Australia. Three alternative products were 
evaluated: liquefied natural gas (LNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and compressed 
natural gas (CNG). LNG projects require a very large gas resource to underwrite long-term 
supply contracts with customers, and project lead times are long. LNG projects also require 
major capital investments. Such projects are generally adopted when customers are too far 
from the gas resource to be economically reached by pipeline. As this was not the case for 
the PNG Gas Project, the LNG option was not retained. LPG is traded globally. When the 
production of LPG traded globally on an export scale was evaluated, it was found that the 
cost of fractionation, storage, and offloading facilities made this option uneconomical. CNG 
involves pipeline-quality natural gas being compressed and transported in pressure tanks by 
tanker to export markets. A group of energy and transport companies were studying the 
possibility of shipping CNG from PNG to New Zealand in order to replace a declining local 
gas supply in New Zealand and cover what was expected to be a national shortage of 
natural gas beginning in 2009. As far as the PNG Gas Project was concerned, a feasible 
CNG development would have added to, rather than replaced, natural gas exported by 
pipeline (Esso Highlands Ltd. 2006). 
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3.1.2.3  Electric Power Grid Interconnection in Northeast Asia 
Given that 70% of its territory is covered with mountains and its residents are reacting 
extremely negatively to proposals for the construction of power facilities, Korea faces great 
difficulties in finding new sites for power facilities. In order to meet the need for increased 
electricity supply, the Government of the Republic of Korea seems to be very enthusiastic to 
pursue power grid interconnection between the Russian Far East and Korea, although this 
possibility has not yet been officially endorsed by the government. 
Several possible electric power interconnection routes have been proposed. One route 
proposes to link the Russian Far East and Korea directly via North Korea, as shown in 
Figure 2. Simply put, this route entails transporting electricity between the Russian Far East 
and Korea via the construction of high voltage, direct current, transmission lines passing 
through North Korea. According to the 2004 preliminary analysis undertaken by the Korea 
Electrotechnology Research Institute (KERI), the approximate distance of this 
interconnection route is 1,260 km. It is assumed that it would take five years to construct the 
interconnection line and its life expectancy has been calculated as 30 years. Assuming a 
four GW-capacity interconnection, the total investment cost has been estimated as US$2.51 
billion, of which the line construction cost would be an estimated US$1.06 billion and the 
converter cost US$1.45 billion (KERI 2004). Compared to the alternative routes of Russia–
PRC–North Korea–Korea and Russia–Japan–Korea, the route traversing North Korea has 
received the most attention from academic scholars and practitioners in recent years. The 
alternative routes are considered to be more expensive due to their even lengthier 
interconnection distances and the technical difficulties involved in constructing submarine 
cables (Yun and Zhang 2006).  
Figure 2: Alternative Routes of Power Grid Interconnection in Northeast Asia 
 
Notes: The nomenclature is not consistent with ADBI usage 
Source: Park, Yoon, and Kim (2004) 
Concerns about the reliability of interconnected power grids are considerable because their 
malfunctioning can lead to costly and hazardous blackouts, as evidenced by huge blackouts 
that occurred in North America and Europe in the summer of 2003.
5 These concerns may 
have led some NEA countries, like the PRC (Zhao 2004), to take a very cautious stance 
toward importing power from the Russian Far East. For this reason, the PRC needs to look 
into other alternatives to diversify its power supply before considering interconnecting power 
grids with the Russian Far East. The options for diversifying power supplies may be not 
                                                  
5  Leaving tens of millions of people without power, these blackouts were the largest in history but far from the first. 
While the underlying cause of such blackouts is systematic underinvestment in transmission grids as demand for 
power grows and trading for power becomes more widespread, the immediate cause may be operational in 
nature, with slow reactions to a failure in one part of an interconnected system leading to rapidly cascading 
failures in much of the rest of the system (APERC 2004).  
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limited to interconnecting power grids among the NEA countries. Instead, other means of 
diversification, e.g., building nuclear power stations with the support of Russia and importing 
from Russia power equipments for nuclear power plants are worth exploring. As far as Korea 
is concerned, however, these other means may be irrelevant given its earlier discussed 
difficulty in finding new sites for the construction of power facilities (Yun and Zhang 2006). 
3.1.3  Alternative Configurations 
A study of alternative configurations aims to examine whether the proposed configuration of 
the identified project is optimal by investigating those parameters that are critical to its 
overall environmental and social impacts. For the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project in the 
Lao PDR, three parameters have been identified as critical, namely, the size of the Nakai 
reservoir, the flow pattern in the Xe Bang Fai River, and the flow pattern in the Nam Theun 
River. The options considered and conclusions reached are summarized in Table 3. It shows 
that alternative configurations to divert the upper Xe Bang Fai River and increase the size of 
the regulating pond have been incorporated into the final scheme in order to reduce the 
effects of discharges into the Xe Bang Fai River. 
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Options Assessed  Conclusions 
Generation capacity decreases and 
relative cost per unit of energy 
generated increases as reservoir size is 
reduced. For example, if the reservoir is 
reduced to run-of-the-river, 3,220 GWh 
less power per year will be generated 
and the relative generation cost would 
be 236% compared to the Nakai dam 
option of the Nam Theun 2 Project. 
 
Of these options (i) to (v) were found to 
have either no marked impact, were 
prohibitively expensive compared to 
their beneficial impacts, or were 
technically not feasible. Furthermore, a 
subsequent mitigation measure agreed 
with EGAT is to enable electricity 
generation to stop and therefore stop 
discharge into the Xe Bang Fai when 
this river is close to flooding. 
 
Options (vi) and (vii) have been 
incorporated into the scheme. 
 
 












Reduce effects of 
discharges into the Xe 


































Reduce the impacts 
downstream in the 
Nam Theun 
Seven alternatives were considered 
in relation to the size of the reservoir. 
Following public consultation, it was 
agreed that three options would be 
examined further. These were a dam 
at Nakai, a dam further upstream at 
Ban Thalang, and developing the 
project as a run-of-the-river scheme.
 
The following means were 
investigated: 
(i)  divert power station releases 
into the Nam Thon, a tributary of 
the Nam Hinboun; 
(ii)  deepen the river channel of the 
Xe Bang Fai at strategic 
locations; 
(iii)  provide regulation upstream 
where the Xe Bang Fai receives 
water from the project, so as to 
reduce the natural flood 
hydrograph; 
(iv)  build a reservoir in the Nam Se 
Noy tributary, which could then 
possibly be diverted to the Nam 
Phong river system for irrigation 
use; 
(v)  divert the upper Xe Bang Fai 
River; and 
(vi)  increase the size of the 
regulating pond to enable a 
more consistent discharge into 
the Xe Bang Fai during periods 
when the power station is not 
operating; and shut down the 
power station when the Xe Bang 
Fai floods to reduce the 
potential for increased flooding. 
Three options are available to reduce 
the impact of a limited riparian release 
into the Nam Theun; 
(i)  increase in mandatory riparian 
release; 
(ii)  aeration of riparian release; and 
(iii)  partial diversion of a natural 
stream into the Nam Theun to 


















These options were not considered in 
the study of alternatives. The project 
already provides for the riparian release 
to be aerated through a cone valve in 
order to increase the levels of dissolved 
oxygen in the released water. Means for 
optimizing the release for environmental 
and social benefits are being considered 
under the riparian flow study. The 
diversion of another stream into the Nam 
Theun immediately downstream would 
increase the cost of construction for the 
Nakai dam and may not have a 
significant effect on the quality of 
discharge. 
Notes: EGAT = Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
Source: Nam Theun 2 Power Company, Environmental Assessment and Management Plan, November 2004 (cited in 
ADB 2004). 
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3.2  Sites and Routes 
To the extent possible, sites and routes should not be located in sensitive areas such as 
watersheds, forest reserves, natural reserves, cultural and historic heritage sites, or tourism 
spots. This may lead to choosing a longer route over a shorter-distance alternative in order 
to avoid disturbing, or to minimize the disturbance of, these kinds of areas. Moreover, 
construction areas, and the associated areas of vegetation clearance, need to be kept to the 
minimum required for project efficiency. 
3.2.1  An Alternative for the Sales Gas Pipeline Route in the Papua New Guinea Gas 
Project 
An alternative for the sales gas pipeline route would have been to build an entirely new 
ROW to cover the shortest distance over land to the shortest sea crossing of the Torres 
Strait. This would have involved a corridor running roughly southwest from the Kutubu 
Central Production Facility; passing to the south of Mt. Bosavi; running across the 
floodplains of the Strickland, Bamu, and Aramaia rivers to cross the Fly River; then tracking 
south across swamps, savannah, and flooded grassland to a landfall on Torres Strait. A 
sales gas pipeline running along this general corridor might have involved up to 300 km less 
offshore pipeline and could have been some 160 km shorter overall. However, the majority 
of the new corridor would have passed through largely undisturbed forested areas, swamps, 
and other wetlands, causing greater adverse environmental impacts than would the use of 
the existing Kutubu-Kopi-Omati ROW for the sales gas pipeline route. The new ROW would 
also have been technically more challenging than the Kutubu-Kopi-Omati ROW since it 
would have passed through both mountainous and floodplain areas, making both 
construction and logistics more costly. The choice of the existing Kutubu-Kopi-Omati ROW 
was found to be more advantageous in terms of engineering, environmental impact, and cost 
(Esso Highlands Ltd. 2006). 
Even if sites and routes are not located in sensitive areas, the residents near to and along 
routes may react negatively to the construction of large projects due to environmental 
concerns. The potential impact of local public resistance should not be underestimated. The 
not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY) syndrome is not uniform everywhere, but it can delay a project 
or even cause it to be cancelled, even if the extent of the syndrome is modest (Yergin and 
Ziff 2004). Dukert (2005) shows that even where the NIMBY opposition was relatively small 
in scope, it successfully blocked pipeline routes from Canada’s Maritime provinces to New 
England and New York, as well as proposed LNG installations in the United States. This 
clearly suggests that there is great need for project proponents to devise and implement 
outreach and communication strategies aimed at educating the general public in order to 
increase public support. 
3.3  Work Camps and Followers 
The impacts of work camps can be minimized through careful location that helps to minimize 
the associated vegetation clearance and the destruction of endangered species’ and wildlife 
habitats. Based on the experience of the Theun Hinboun Hydroelectric Project in the Lao 
PDR, work camps can attract up to four times as many camp followers (namely, families of 
workers and service providers) (ADB 2004). The workforce and the camp followers put 
pressure on land and natural resources, generate solid and liquid wastes, and increase 
public health risks. An assessment of the EIAs undertaken for three completed projects in 
the Lao PDR (Theun Hinboun, Houay Ho, and Nam Leuk) found that the negative impacts 
connected with the influx of workers and camp followers were, in general, inadequately 
addressed and planned for (Norplan 2004). Mitigation measures need to be well developed 
in order to reduce these potential impacts. Otherwise, inappropriate solid waste disposal 
could lead to the contamination of soil, groundwater, and rivers, and the spread of pests and 
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communicable diseases, while inadequate treatment of wastewater could cause water 
quality problems in adjacent water bodies. In addition, project developers need to investigate 
how the impact of work camps could be further reduced by minimizing the number of 
followers through, e.g., maximizing the employment of people from and/or close to the 
project area. 
3.4  Awards of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and Licenses 
for Prospective Project Developers 
Developing and implementing a proper contract awarding system can help to avoid or 
minimize the potentially negative environmental and social impacts of planned projects. To 
ensure greater transparency and the better integration of EIA findings with technical 
planning, it is preferable that a competitive bidding system be introduced to replace the MOU 
negotiation-based awarding system. Alternatively, the content of MOUs should be 
standardized to include environmental and social requirements. At a minimum, contract-
awarding authorities need to develop a comprehensive document, for up-front presentation 
to prospective developers, which outlines the environmental and social requirements 
contained in laws and regulations. There is also a need to standardize concession licenses 
to include environmental and social provisions so as to ensure that these requirements are 
made legally binding (Norplan 2004). 
3.5  Environmental or Green Credentials of the Head Construction 
Contractor 
The head construction contractor (HCC) is responsible for implementing measures to avoid 
or minimize environmental, social, and health impacts during construction. The HCC’s 
environmental credentials, in addition to its other technical and financial credentials, are 
crucial, and certain standards of credential should be considered a prerequisite for qualifying 
as a contractor. This means that the HCC should apply international standard quality 
assurance procedures and an environmental management system in full compliance with 
either International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 14001 or the European Union Eco-
Audit and Management Scheme (EMAS). To avoid the potentially limiting effects of this 
specification, governments may refer to, or demand adherence to, the specified 
environmental management standards “or equivalent” (Zhang and Assunção 2004). This will 
allow those contractors in full compliance with comparable or similar environmental 
management systems to be eligible to participate in bidding for construction contracts.  
3.6  Public Consultation and Disclosure Processes 
A lack of both transparency and civil society participation during the project design stage is 
often cited as a particular problem of cross-border infrastructure projects. To minimize a 
project’s potential negative impacts, project-affected people and communities and other 
concerned stakeholders need to be engaged in a public consultation and disclosure process 
during project design. This not only enables project-affected people and communities to 
speak freely about their concerns. More importantly, this process ensures that concerns are 
addressed and, wherever necessary, incorporated into project planning and design, the 
selection of resettlement sites, and the formulation of appropriate remedial measures. The 
affected parties’ close involvement in and understanding of this process will in turn help to 
minimize the likelihood of adverse outcomes with regard to the resettlement, compensation, 
and rehabilitation plans. An assessment of the EIAs for three completed projects in the Lao 
PDR (Theun Hinboun, Houay Ho, and Nam Leuk) found that compensation and resettlement 
needs were underestimated and insufficiently planned and budgeted for (Norplan 2004).  
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For new projects, there is also a general tendency to underestimate resettlement needs in 
the initial phases of project preparation, partly to keep the overall costs down in order to 
make the proposed projects appear economically sound, and partly to avoid triggering a 
demand for a resettlement action plan, as required by the multilateral development banks 
and national regulations.
6 As a result, throughout this region, project developers and project-
affected people and communities are frequently in conflict with one another regarding 
compensation and resettlement settlements. In the case of the Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh 
City Highway Project, complaints were filed claiming that the level of compensation paid was 
not adequate to restore the economic and social bases of the people affected by the 
Cambodian component. Of the total of 18 review missions undertaken by ADB after their 
loan became effective, 7 were resettlement review missions in response to the problems that 
had occurred. ADB undertook these review missions and the subsequent resettlement audits 
to determine the validity of the complaints and work with the government to resolve them 
(ADB 2007b). Clearly, having project-affected people and communities involved in a process 
of public consultation and disclosure should help to determine the proper compensation and 
resettlement arrangements in advance of project implementation. 
3.7  Advisory Groups 
An advisory group or panel of experts needs to be established for every project. This group 
should have a mandate to undertake an independent review of and provide guidance on the 
overall aspects of the project, including environmental and social issues. Amongst other 
duties, the group should produce independent reports concerning the project’s compliance 
with environmental and social safeguards and funding agency guidelines, and it should 
recommend remedial measures to be applied in the event of non-compliance with said 
safeguards and guidelines. A coordinator should be appointed, at the request of the 
countries concerned, in cases where projects encounter implementation difficulties. 
4.  KEY ISSUES OF CROSS-BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE 
PROJECTS 
In addition to the issues outlined in the previous two sections of this paper, issues which are 
shared by all infrastructure projects regardless of their location, cross-border projects face 
additional challenges relative to national projects. The existence of technical, regulatory, 
institutional, and legal obstacles constrain the development of cross-border infrastructure 
projects. Achieving a policy framework—at the national level and/or, wherever necessary, at 
the regional level—that can support the development of such projects and ensure that they 
operate properly and reliably while also managing and minimizing their environmental 
impacts, requires proper technical specifications and well-functioning regulatory, institutional, 
and legislative/legal frameworks with clear lines of oversight. 
4.1  Technical Specifications 
One of the challenges for cross-border infrastructure projects is that each participating 
country may have different standards, guidelines, and procedures for technical matters. 
Because these standards and procedures etc. can vary in both content and point of 
implementation, the extent to which they impede the development of cross-border projects 
differs depending on the project type. For example, technical specifications specific to a 
cross-border road project will only involve road and bridge design and signage standards at 
the construction stage, whereas technical standards are essential throughout both the 
                                                  
6 For example, World Bank and Lao PDR guidelines require a resettlement action plan be produced once the 
number of anticipated resettlements arising from any one project exceeds 200 people (Norplan 2004). 
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construction and operation of a cross-border power project if it is to maintain its operational 
integrity. To remedy this, once sites and routes have been set, the involved countries need 
to agree to detailed technical specifications and develop harmonized standards for design, 
construction, operation, maintenance, health, safety and environment, and measurement in 
order to mitigate potential risks and environmental impacts. Differences in standards and 
procedures etc. may also contribute to the previously mentioned concerns about the 
reliability of interconnected power grids. 
4.2  Regulatory Frameworks 
Regulatory issues include pricing, tariffs, transit and user fees, access and use, transmission 
regulation, metering, load specifications, insurance standards, health and safety, security of 
supply, and emergency supply arrangements. Arrangements for pricing, tariffs, and access 
and use are especially critical, because under-pricing in the receiving markets, excessive 
transit and user fees, restrictions on or unfavorable transmission of transit access, unclear 
interconnection requirements, and excessive liability insurance requirements all hamper the 
development of cross-border projects. In this section, the focus will be on these key 
regulatory issues. Special attention is devoted to the ways in which problems associated 
with these key regulatory issues can be tackled. 
4.2.1  Pricing and Tariffs 
“Energy security” is often a readily used defense for a country’s reluctance to be dependent 
on another country for its energy supply or to export what is viewed as a strategic national 
asset. This political consideration, combined with under-pricing of natural gas and power in 
receiving markets, further hampers the development of cross-border power and natural gas 
projects. For example, in a receiving country where diesel is heavily subsidized, diesel-fired 
utilities are also, in effect, heavily subsidized unless tariffs include at least the amount of 
subsidies to diesel inputs. Utilities such as these will resist the opening of the domestic 
market in the first place. Even if domestic markets are open for competition, piped natural 
gas-fired utilities will not be able to compete on price until diesel and other fossil fuel 
subsidies are removed in the receiving markets. This suggests that domestic regulations 
must contain the correct economic incentives at the outset, in order to encourage the 
building of cross-border projects. Individual governments need to move towards market-
based pricing systems and away from practices such as price interventions and tax 
distortions, which lead to the inefficient pricing of natural gas or power.  
 Similarly, power tariffs are crucial in determining whether electric power grid interconnection 
takes off, because average generation costs and price levels in receiving markets will serve 
as benchmarks for imported power. Take the proposed power grid interconnection between 
the Russian Far East and Korea. As of 2003, the average generation cost and electricity 
price were, respectively, 4.1 and 6.2 cents per KWh in Korea, whereas the average power 
tariff in European Russia was reported to be around 1.0 cent per kWh as at late 2001 (Korea 
Power Exchange 2004; Belyaev, Marchenko, and Podkovalnikov 2003). This substantial 
differential in electricity prices suggests that substantial cost savings could be achieved 
through grid interconnection and power trade between the two countries. However, electricity 
prices in Russia have historically been determined in large part by state-owned enterprises 
and have not fully reflected the costs of generating and delivering power. As the Russian 
government has planned to both relinquish subsidies for electricity by lifting price controls on 
generation fuels, natural gas in particular, and introduce a bidding mechanism for supply 
contracts, competition among suppliers in the power market can be expected to intensify and 
prices can be expected to rise towards market levels. Consequently, the differential in 
electricity price as currently observed between Korea and Russia will diminish in the future.  
This picture may change or at least prices may not converge that quickly if electricity tariffs 
include externality costs, such as environmental costs associated with the generation and 
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transmission of power. This is because of the increased share of hydropower in the total 
generating capacity in the Russian Far East. Currently, hydropower accounts for about 20% 
of the total. As the Russian government has made hydropower generation a priority, 
particularly in the Russian Far East (Energy Information Administration 2004), this share is 
estimated to rise to more than 35% in 2025 (Podkovalnikov 2002). So, if the environmental 
and social costs were to be internalized into electricity tariffs, this would correct distorted 
competition and increase the competitiveness of cleaner power supply, such as hydropower, 
electric power grid interconnection and power export from the Russian Far East (Yun and 
Zhang 2006). 
One method through which to internalize environmental benefits is to add the value of 
carbon credits. Cross-border energy projects often provide global environmental benefits in 
terms of reduced GHG emissions, by using hydropower and/or natural gas in place of coal 
and/or oil, and/or by preserving carbon sinks, e.g., through the maintenance of land and 
forest coverage. Table 4 presents a preliminary economic assessment of the environmental 
and social impacts of the Nam Theun 2 Project. It shows that the global benefits arising from 
the value of both the maintenance of the carbon sink and reduced GHG emissions are six 
times that of the identified local costs. When discounted at a rate of 10%, the estimated 
global benefit of the Nam Theun 2 Project accounts for 6.8% of its total estimated base cost 
of approximately US$1.25 billion (ADB 2005). A cross-border project of this kind may well 
qualify as a so-called clean development mechanism (CDM) project under the Kyoto 
Protocol. If so, the additional cash flow from CDM credits, the so-called certified emission 
reductions (CERs), will boost internal rates of return. Whether the added value arising from 
CERs is sufficient to cover the incremental costs of implementing cross-border projects 
depends on the price of CERs. If the price is high enough, the corresponding stream of 
CERs could be the decisive factor that renders these projects viable (Zhang 2006a). Let me 
elaborate this point a little further.  
The report on the environmental and social impacts of the Nam Theun 2 Project (ADB 2004) 
does not give the carbon price that was used in calculating the aforementioned global 
benefits, but it can be assumed that the price used in this calculation did not exceed US$5 
per ton of CO2 equivalent. The rationale for this assumption is as follows. In the early stages 
of the carbon market, the World Bank and the Dutch government were the two most active 
buyers of carbon credits in project-based transactions. In terms of volume, these two players 
represented over half of the world’s market for carbon at that time. The World Bank’s 
Prototype Carbon Fund, the first global carbon fund, paid the highest purchase price of 
US$4.25 per ton of CO2 equivalent for CERs until the end of 2004. The Dutch CER unit 
procurement tender (CERUPT) program was aiming at price levels of about US$5 per ton of 
CO2 equivalent at that time. The offering prices of the PCF and CERUPT were not intended 
to serve as market prices. However, given their dominant roles on the buyers’ side in the 
early stages of the carbon market, in practice they acted as standard-setters for this market. 
Given the fact that the publicly disclosed offering prices of PCF and CERUPT projects 
provided information on abatement costs
7, both in economies in transition and developing 
countries, it is conceivable that private players were unwilling to go beyond these price 
boundaries (Zhang 2006b). Since then, the carbon market has expanded rapidly. The CDM 
market increased from 563 million tons of CERs and €3.9 billion in 2006, to 947 million tons 
of CERs and €12 billion in 2007 (Point Carbon 2008). The expansion of the carbon market 
has been accompanied by a significant increase in the price of CERs, arising from the CDM 
projects. Currently, the price of CERs ranges from US$12 to US$22 per ton of CO2 
equivalent in forward purchase agreements and CERs are traded at around the US$26 mark 
per ton of CO2 equivalent in the secondary issue market. If the prevailing price of CERs were 
used, this would significantly increase the aforementioned global benefits arising from the 
                                                  
7 An abatement cost is a cost borne by many businesses for the removal and/or reduction of an undesirable item 
that they have created as a byproduct of production. 
19 ADBI Working Paper 261    Zhang 
 
Nam Theun 2 Project. This case clearly indicates how crucial the value of carbon credits is 
to rendering a cross-border infrastructure project viable. 
Table 4: Preliminary Economic Assessment of Environmental and Social Impacts for 
the Nam Theun 2 Project 
(present value terms using 10% discount rate) 
Areas Local  Global  Remarks 
  (US$ million)  (US$ million)   
  Cost Benefit  Cost  Benefit   
Nam  Theun       · Costs result from potential loss of fisheries
downstream  N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I.  · Results from a riparian release study  
of the Nakai 
Dam 







N.I. 50  · Local benefits result from improved and 
maintained income levels due to better 
resource management and developments 
of new economic activities (e.g., 
ecotourism) 
Area      · Global benefits arise from maintenance 
of the carbon sink value of the NPA. 
Nakai plateau  4.4-5.4  8.5- 
11.5 
0 35  · Local costs result from loss of existing 
  economic activities on the plateau. 
- Local  benefits result from the higher 
levels of income expected from the 
livelihood programs. 
       · Global benefits result from reduced  
  emissions of greenhouse gases from 
the Project compared to the best 
alternative energy source (gas 
combined cycle). 
Xe Bang Fai  6.8-9.4  0.25  0  0  · Local costs mainly derive from the  
  estimated loss of fisheries. Results of  
  hydrology study are still to be 
  incorporated. 
       · Benefits do not include potential for  
  significant increase in irrigation and  
  agricultural production. To be realized, 
  these benefits require additional 
investments not supported by the Project. 
Mekong  River  N.I. N.I. N.I. N.I.  · Analysis will incorporate the findings of 
the CIA study. 
  Total 
 
11.2-14.8 26-48  N.I.  85   
 
Notes: N.I. = none identified or quantified at the time of report preparation, NPA = national protected area. 
Sources: Nam Theun 2 Power Company, Environmental Assessment and Management Plan, November 2004; Social 
Development Plan, November 2004; Social and Environment Management Framework and First Operational Plan, 
October 2004 (cited in ADB 2004). 
4.2.2  Access and Use 
For cross-border projects involving two countries, regulatory issues can be resolved by the 
governments. Indeed, cross-border gas pipeline interconnections in ASEAN are currently 
based on bilateral arrangements between the two countries concerned. However, for wider 
power grid or pipeline interconnections, more formal arrangements are necessary to provide 
participants with sufficient assurances with regard to system operation, pricing or tariffs, 
transmission or transit access, and fees. Unlike the gas market in Europe, which is well 
developed, cross-border gas pipeline interconnections in ASEAN are still in an early stage of 
development. Nevertheless, cross-border issues such as transit across third countries will 
become increasingly important as the implementation of the TAGP evolves. The experience 
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of Russia, the Ukraine, and the Asian republics of the former Soviet Union shows that the 
setting of tariffs for energy flows in transit, lack of transparency in conditions for gaining 
access to export capacity in gas pipelines, and the illegal taking of gas in transit, have been 
the main problems associated with cross-border energy flows. These problems have also 
been experienced over the last 15 years in Eurasia.
8 Clearly, these issues are not easy to 
agree on or resolve, but nevertheless they will need to be addressed through more formal 
arrangements before a more integrated cross-border TAGP infrastructure can be realized. 
One avenue would be to take the relevant article under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) as 
a reference in setting transit tariffs. This is feasible given that all NEA countries, except for 
North Korea, have signed, acceded to, or obtained observer status with (the PRC and 
Korea) the ECT, and ASEAN as a single entity has had a seat as an observer since 2003. 
Article 7.3 under the ECT requires that transit tariffs be no less favorable than export and/or 
import tariffs. This means that in the case of transit of gas from one ASEAN country to 
another, via the medium of a more integrated cross-border TAGP network, the transit tariffs 
in the first country must be no less favorable than the export and/or import tariffs on gas 
into/from the second. However, it is not in violation of the ECT provisions if transit tariffs are 
higher than tariffs on domestic transportation (Konoplyanik 2005). 
Another avenue would be via the establishment of a structured regional regulatory regime. In 
the GMS, for example, power flows are currently mostly one-way, but the goal of the GMS 
nations is to create a regional power trade. At the first GMS summit in 2002, the leaders of 
the six countries signed the Inter-Governmental Agreement on Regional Power Trade in 
support of this concept. This agreement reflects the highest political commitment to promote 
a regional power trade. The first step in establishing a GMS power market will be to build or 
strengthen the necessary institutional structures within the GMS countries themselves. 
Transmission lines must be planned and built in each country to allow for an increase in 
cross-border power transfers (ADB 2007a). Following this, there will be a need for a regional 
regulatory regime for power interconnections and their operation. In this regard, the Regional 
Electricity Regulatory Authority (RERA) in Southern Africa provides an interesting example. 
The RERA was established in 2001 as a formal association with separate legal status. Each 
of the member economies of the Southern Africa Development Community is entitled, 
through its energy regulatory arm, to a single membership. The RERA cannot interfere with 
national mandates but works toward establishing common regional rules related to issues 
such as system operation, transmission access, transmission pricing and cross-border 
trading, and towards the establishment of a regional regulatory framework for market 
liberalization (Stafford 2005). 
Appropriate measures to ensure security of supply and emergency supply arrangements are 
also essential. Further, having a framework of cooperation helps in the event of a serious 
disruption of power or natural gas supply. The strengthening of safety and security standards 
is necessary to ensure the safe and secure operation of cross-border infrastructure projects 
and the lack of common standards has indeed been a problem for these projects. Therefore, 
incentives for investments in safety and security should be provided. They should be market-
based, and the level of incentives should be commensurate with infrastructure risk 
assessments (Borchert and Forster 2007).  
4.3  Institutional Frameworks 
Institutional arrangements, either formal or informal, are crucial to the success of cross-
border infrastructure projects. However, the specifics of institutional requirements will differ 
according to project type. The level of institutional arrangements required will also vary and 
                                                  
8 The Transit Protocol to the Energy Charter Treaty, which is currently being negotiated, aims to address these 
problems. Although a wide degree of agreement has been achieved on nearly all substantive aspects of the draft 
text, the Transit Protocol remains unfinished because of differences in position between the European Union and 
Russia regarding the aforementioned three issues.  
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can extend from the project level to the national or even higher level arrangements. With 
regard to EIAs, detailed institutional arrangements are needed to provide the required legal 
framework, promote coordination among agencies, and ensure the responsibility and 
accountability of each party involved in the entire process. 
On the topic of project-specific institutional arrangements, one project-specific issue is the 
asymmetric distribution of costs and benefits between involved parties. While some cross-
border projects are mutually beneficial to parties, in most cases there is an unequal sharing 
of the benefits. This issue needs to be addressed at the project planning and design stages. 
The financing and upgrading of a road in the Lao PDR that forms part of the GMS North-
South Corridor provides an interesting example of an arrangement that recognizes the 
different benefits to the different parties. This 228 km road aims to complete the missing 
section in an all-weather road link between Kunming Province in the PRC and Bangkok in 
Thailand and, as agreed, is financed equally through loans from ADB, and the Governments 
of the PRC and Thailand. The Lao PDR is only financing some of the local costs, despite the 
project being wholly within its boundaries. This example illustrates the possibility that while 
the country through which the road passes may not gain the largest benefit from it, a win-win 
arrangement can be made to align the costs with the benefits of the main parties. 
Another issue is the overall sustainability of a cross-border project. As the project may have 
several country components, the issue of the sustainability of each country’s component 
over time is of great concern. In the case of the Phnom Penh to Ho Chi Minh City Highway 
Project, expenditure on the maintenance of the Cambodian component has been well below 
the required level. The roads are currently in good condition, with little sign of damage, but 
as the level of overloaded truck traffic on the project roads increases in step with growing 
trade movement between Cambodia and Viet Nam, the need for regular periodic 
maintenance will intensify (ADB 2007b). The less strict adherence to load limits and 
inadequate levels of expenditure for road maintenance raises the question of the 
sustainability of the Cambodian component. Clearly, if the Cambodian component is not 
sustainable the overall project is not sustainable, even if the Vietnamese component is 
rigorously maintained. This case clearly illustrates the need for coordinated arrangements 
among the involved parties to ensure the overall sustainability of a cross-border project. 
Also at the project level, an environmental management office (EMO) needs to be 
established. The EMO is assigned the responsibility for technical planning, implementation, 
and internal monitoring of all the environmental mitigation and compensation measures 
under the project developer’s responsibility. It is also responsible for ensuring that the HCC 
fully meets its contractual and environmental management obligations. The EMO needs to 
regularly review the status of project impacts and make recommendations to the project 
developer that will enable it to rectify any failure to meet its environmental obligations as 
specified under the agreement with the central government. The EMO also needs to report 
regularly to an environment management unit, as will be discussed below. 
Strong national institutions are also crucial to reduce the negative impacts of cross-border 
projects. At the national level, institutions are often not equipped with the necessary 
resources, staff, skills, and experience to either enforce existing regulations or to design, 
implement, monitor, inspect, and enforce new and effective environmental polices. Take, as 
an example, the responsibility to both undertake and implement an EIA. Having a mandatory 
EIA and a good EIA report are just the first steps. It is more important that the measures to 
mitigate the environmental effects of construction projects outlined in the EIA are 
implemented and monitored. It is common to this region that there is a weak delineation of 
responsibility and accountability when it comes to the planning and implementation of EIAs. 
The respective roles of the agencies responsible for undertaking EIAs and those authorities 
responsible for approving and monitoring EIAs (for e.g., environmental ministries or 
equivalent agencies) are unclear and ill-defined under present EIA processes. Moreover, the 
interrelationships between the undertaking, approving, and monitoring authorities and the 
parties (contractors) proposing the measures to meet and execute EIA requirements are 
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usually informal and not well set out. Consequently, coordination across the ministries and 
authorities concerned is weak, ineffective, and sometimes totally absent. This has given rise 
to weak enforcement, absence of monitoring, and lack of commitment from the various 
agencies in charge of undertaking, approving, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating 
EIAs. As a result, even if the quality of EIA reports looks good on paper (in other words, the 
EIA reports have genuinely assisted in planning better projects and identifying needs for 
mitigation measures and compensation), a lack of coordination and commitment from 
responsible agencies can thwart desirable outcomes.   
Clearly, there is a need to clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the agencies 
involved to ensure that environmental and resettlement plans are effectively implemented. 
To that end, an environment management unit (EMU) should be established under the 
direction of the relevant government department. This unit should consist of representatives 
from the concerned departments at the level of central government and also from the 
affected provincial and local governments. The EMU is specifically designed to implement 
and manage the environmental components of the agreement signed with the project 
developer and it is also responsible for ensuring good environmental management at 
spontaneous settlements. The unit also reviews the EMO’s reports on the monitoring 
performance of both the HCC and project developer during project construction and 
operation, and should then make the corresponding recommendations to the government on 
any remedial steps that need to be taken to rectify problems. Empowered by the central 
government, the EMU, in consultation with the project developer, should engage an 
independent monitoring agency to externally monitor and evaluate the environmental 
measures implemented. This agency then reports its findings to the EMU and the project 
developer.  
Another reflection of weak institutions at the national level is the failure to integrate regional 
infrastructure projects with national plans and priorities. Regional infrastructure projects 
require commitments from all of the countries involved. If a country’s domestic infrastructure 
is substantially underdeveloped, its government may, understandably, give priority to 
domestic infrastructure development before embarking on a regional project that may be 
perceived as giving a large portion of the benefits to outsiders. Clearly, national institutional 
capacity needs to be strengthened in order to have a better understanding of domestic 
infrastructure programs, priorities, and resources, and the potential domestic benefits of 
cross-border infrastructure projects. There is no point in having ambitious regional 
infrastructure goals if national institutions are unable to integrate regional infrastructure 
projects with national plans and priorities, and to align regional ambitions with a realistic 
assessment of domestic implementation capacities.   
Regional institutional frameworks or arrangements are also crucial to effective cooperation 
on cross-border energy projects. Indeed, the lack of a regional institutional framework has 
been one of the major obstacles impeding electricity sector cooperation among the NEA 
countries. In this subregion, there is no overall trade agreement or convention, such as the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which binds the six countries involved. In 
addition, there is no trade or economic-focused organization, such as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the World Trade Organization (WTO), which includes all 
six countries as its members. Therefore, the creation of a regional institutional framework is 
important for energy cooperation among the NEA countries. The highly collaborative 
planning process that supports the ASEAN Power Grid Project, and which is clearly backed 
by governments and supported by power system experts, is a valuable model. If the 
proposed power grid interconnection in NEA is to achieve sufficient support and momentum 
to be realized, a similar process with political backing may be needed (APERC 2004).  
To make energy cooperation more effective, the governments of the NEA could go further by 
establishing a regional institutional framework specifically for energy cooperation. This 
framework would set up the common rules of the game and the countries involved would be 
obliged to observe these rules in practice. However, views do differ regarding the specific 
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form of such a framework. Some favor the option that all six NEA countries become 
members of the ECT, whereas others support the establishment of an NEA ECT (Yun and 
Zhang 2006). At this stage, it is uncertain which option will prevail, but it is safe to say that, 
even if the six NEA countries decide to establish an NEA ECT to promote even closer 
energy cooperation among member countries, the experience of the Energy Charter process 
will provide a reference for regional cooperation in the NEA region. Taken together, these 
various instruments should be seen as complementary parts of integrated international 
efforts to strengthen overall global energy cooperation and security. 
The institutional arrangements in place at country borders are also important. Despite 
progress in Malaysia–Thailand railway collaboration, container trucks and their drivers are 
still not permitted to cross the border in either direction, and boxes must be transported from 
one set of equipment to another (Stafford 2005). A commission needs to be established or 
assigned to regulate the cross-border flow of goods and trading.  
4.4  Environmental Legislation 
The majority of Asian countries have comprehensive and modern environmental assessment 
legislation in place. However, the implementation of legislation has been a big issue for the 
region and has depended upon the capacities, power, and resources of the regulatory 
agencies as well as the overall environmental awareness of project developers. For example, 
the PRC’s EIA law, which took effect on 1 September 2003, mandates that all construction 
projects must have undergone a proper EIA prior to construction commencing. In January 
2005, the PRC’s State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) called for a halt to 30 
industrial projects (the majority of which were power-generating projects) worth CNY119.7 
billion, on the grounds that they had not undergone proper EIAs. Many of these blacklisted 
projects were so-called “national key projects,” approved by the powerful National 
Development and Reform Commission, the PRC’s top economic planning agency, and the 
projects themselves were not necessarily highly polluting. This unprecedented move by the 
SEPA served as a public education campaign to increase awareness of the EIA law (Zhang 
2007a; Zhang 2007b).  
Even where EIAs have been undertaken, based on an assessment of the EIAs for three 
competed projects in the Lao PDR, they have in general tended to underestimate both the 
environmental and social impacts of their projects and the mitigation costs (Norplan 2004). 
This may largely be because, throughout this region, EIAs have often been taken as a 
supplementary requirement that is secondary to overall economic issues (United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP] 2001). 
Understandably, underestimating environmental and social impacts and their associated 
costs will make the proposed project look good on paper and thus increase its chance of 
being implemented, in particular if those projects are favored or put forward by the 
administrative authorities. 
As far as the legislation itself is concerned, it suffers from common weaknesses, namely, 
inadequacies in: setting out institutional responsibilities at different stages of the process; 
coverage; requirements and guidelines for impact assessments for projects of different 
scales; and enforcement procedures. If project developers are to follow guidelines and 
procedures, legislation needs to be concise, clear, and transparent. All projects must then be 
required to conduct EIAs in accordance with legislative requirements. EIAs identify types and 
sources of environmental impacts and develop environmental management plans detailing 
mitigation and compensation measures and plans for monitoring project construction and 
operation.  
Once EIA guidelines and procedures have been clearly defined, the quality of EIA reports 
then depends on the credentials of the agencies carrying out the assessments. 
Unfortunately, EIA laws are often vague on the recommended credentials and scopes of 
these kinds of agencies. There is a need to establish additional means for defining the 
24 ADBI Working Paper 261    Zhang 
 
credentials required of agencies that wish to undertake EIAs of construction projects. For 
example, the PRC introduced new rules effective from 1 January 2006. Under these rules 
there are two grades of credentials: Grade A and Grade B. The required qualifications for 
each grade and the corresponding scope of EIA work are clearly specified. An agency with 
Grade A credentials is allowed to undertake an EIA on any construction project, whereas 
agencies with Grade B credentials are only allowed to carry out an EIA on a construction 
project that requires approval by the environmental regulatory agency below the provincial 
level (SEPA 2005). Therefore, the EIAs of construction projects that range across provinces 
and river basins can only be done by Grade A agencies. As cross-border projects will, by 
definition, cross provincial borders, this implicitly means that only Grade A agencies are 
eligible to perform the EIAs on these projects. To maintain the quality of EIAs, the PRC also 
limits the total number of agencies awarded Grade A credentials,
9 and provides that all 
agencies with either Grade A or Grade B credentials will be held accountable for their EIAs. 
Those found violating the relevant provisions will be downgraded or their credentials’ 
certificate forfeited, and a penalty of one to three times their EIA service charge will be 
imposed (SEPA 2005).
10 
All EIA guidelines stress the importance of the public consultation and disclosure process. 
However, an assessment of the EIAs for three competed projects in the Lao PDR (Theun 
Hinboun, Houay Ho and Nam Leuk) found that consultation and public involvement 
processes have, for the most part, been inadequate in relation to internationally-accepted 
safeguard procedures (Norplan 2004). This may be primarily because EIA guidelines are 
unclear as to the extent to which the public should be engaged in these processes. It is often 
the case that the project developer starts engaging the public only after the project has 
received approval from the administrative authorities. At this stage, the public is not in a 
position favorable to the effective voicing of concerns and suggestions. Therefore, the EIA 
guidelines need to clearly specify that public consultation needs to be undertaken at the 
earliest possible stage, albeit conditional upon the public’s right to know. At present there are 
hardly any provisions under the EIA laws throughout the region that stipulate to whom, how, 
and in what format project information must be disclosed. This hampers public participation 
in the EIA process.    
When preparing EIAs other relevant legislation, for example, on endangered species and 
environmental quality, etc., also needs to be considered because such legislation may have 
its own EIA provisions which are relevant to all or part of the project. For example, the Thai 
National Environmental Quality Act requires an EIA be undertaken for transmission lines that 
pass through a watershed area of a specified class and an initial environmental examination 
be prepared if the line passes through a forest reserve (ADB 2004). 
As discussed earlier, for a large project that may have sector-wide and/or economy-wide 
implications, a strategic impact assessment (SIA) needs to be undertaken in order to identify 
both the potential impacts at these broader levels and the options available to avoid them. 
However, the current environmental assessment legislation in many Asian countries does 
not contain SIA provisions. This means that even if externally-funded projects have 
undergone a proper SIA, the governments of certain countries do not have to commit to its 
implementation because it is not mandated under their domestic legislation. Moreover, for 
those countries that do have SIA provisions in their environmental assessment legislation, 
the provisions are too general to be of much practical use. For example, they do not specify 
which kinds of projects require mandatory SIA reports, nor the approval procedures for SIA 
reports once prepared. Thus, detailed regulations need to be established to put SIA 
provisions into effective operation. This will not be an easy matter, as exemplified in the PRC 
                                                  
9  The PRC has 201 agencies with Grade A credentials and 772 agencies with Grade B credentials (China 
Environmental Daily 2005). 
10 The PRC’s Ministry of Environmental Protection circulated a notice of criticism regarding three EIA-undertaking 
agencies highlighting their low quality work and ordering the three-month suspension of one key EIA engineer 
who took main responsibility for one of the aforementioned low quality EIAs (Sina Net 2009). 
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whose state environmental regulatory agency drafted the legislation on SIAs in 2005, in 
order to move the EIAs mandated at the project level to a deeper level of planning, with the 
expectation that it would be adopted in the first half of 2007. However, as of now this 
legislation is still under review by the legal office of the State Council (the PRC’s Cabinet). 
The main reason for delay is that the SIA’s focus on long-term general interests is in conflict 
with local governments’ focus on pushing for high economic growth in their regions by 
pursuing projects that can achieve quick, short-term results as well as the sectoral focus on 
examination and approval rights over planning.
11 Moreover, based on the PRC’s tentative 
legislation, the legitimated planning, examination, and approval agencies will be the ones 
empowered to approve SIA reports, rather than the PRC’s environmental regulatory agency. 
As a result, environmental regulatory agencies in charge of environmental protection will 
play more of an advisory role and will not be able to determine the contents of, nor reject, the 
SIA reports.   
4.5  Legal Frameworks for Investment 
Cross-border infrastructure investments are highly capital intensive, and involve fixed 
infrastructure formation and long project cycles with long payback periods. These 
characteristics make a stable legal framework especially important for these kinds of 
infrastructure investments. It is the lack of legal frameworks that hampers cross-border 
projects. Therefore, this section is dedicated to a discussion of business and investment 
legislation. While the environmental legislation discussed in the previous section is essential 
to ensuring that the impacts of an approved cross-border project are kept to a minimum or 
acceptable level, the business and investment legislation will be the decisive factor that 
determines whether such a project will get off the ground in the first place. 
The major subjects that need to be clearly defined in legal frameworks include:  
z  rights of passage for goods, people, and vehicles; 
z  measures to facilitate transit rights (e.g., permits, licenses, consents, or other 
authorizations) and arrangements for compensation to transit states for the rights that 
they grant as well as for property and risk; 
z  provision of dispute resolution mechanisms to deal with consultation and settlement of 
disputes; and 
z  determination of jurisdiction and responsibility over, or title and ownership of, the 
offshore segments of a pipeline, particularly those outside a state’s own territorial 
waters. 
It is often a tedious process to obtain the required permits. Meanwhile, legal uncertainties 
resulting from overlapping national, regional, and municipal jurisdictions only compound the 
problem. In the case of a project that faces overlapping jurisdictions, there is no assurance 
as to when the project can start, even if it obtains central authorization, because many other 
local authorizations must be obtained, a process over which the central government has no 
control. For example, in the case of the aforementioned NIMBY syndrome, NIMBY protests 
can stem not only from local publics but also from resistance on the part of local authorities 
who operate in areas that, say, pipelines must cross to serve markets beyond their vicinity. 
Thus, it is imperative not only to have legal frameworks in place, but also to have 
streamlined and transparent procedures and sound governance, and clearer lines of 
responsibility and function at various levels of government. Clearly, there is much scope for 
governments at all levels to improve in these areas. 
                                                  
11 See Zhang (2008) for further discussion on coordination between central and local governments on 
environmental issues. 
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When it comes to investment protection, the ECT is the only multilateral investment treaty in 
the energy sector that provides a high level of investment protection. It sets out dispute 
resolution procedures that allow for binding international arbitration in the event of disputes 
between states, or between states and individual companies. In the event of investor-state 
disputes, the ECT mandates conciliation as a first step but if that fails the investor can 
choose the forum for dispute resolution—either a domestic court or international arbitration. 
If the investor chooses international arbitration, it can submit the dispute to the International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) if one or both parties are party to 
the ICSID Convention, or the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, or the 
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm International Chamber of Commerce. Awards of such 
institutions are binding on the parties and enforceable. 
4.6  The Role of the Asian Development Bank 
ADB’s role as an external sponsor, serving as a disinterested honest broker, catalyst, source 
of assistance (both technical and financial), and mobilizer of external resources, has been an 
important factor contributing to the success of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
cooperation on cross-border infrastructure planning and development. The multilateral 
development banks, like ADB, need to continue to play these multiple roles.  
In the context of EIAs, ADB has played and needs to continue to play a role in building 
capacities for the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of EIAs, cumulative impact 
assessments (CIAs), SIAs, and environmental management plans (EMPs). Well-functioning 
assessment institutions implicitly require qualified personnel with the right understanding and 
appreciation of the issues and the ability to make scientific assessments and informed 
decisions. Given that the management and minimization of the environmental impacts of 
cross-border projects requires well-functioning regulatory, monitoring, and enforcement 
capabilities within oversight institutions, it is important that both environmental authorities 
and project developers are able to prepare EIAs, CIAs, SIAs and to supervise the 
implementation of EMPs. This calls for a strengthened role for ADB in developing these 
capacities among both environmental authorities and project developers. As quality of EIA 
reports has been a big concern, ADB involvement as a project sponsor should help to 
improve the quality of reports because of its stricter requirements regarding  EIAs, which 
spring from its role, as with other multilateral development banks, as provider of loans and 
other risk mitigation instruments, such as guarantees.  
The involvement of ADB also helps to avoid the underestimation of compensation and 
resettlement needs, as well as insufficient planning and budgeting for those needs, because 
a resettlement action plan acceptable to ADB is a prerequisite for project appraisal. ADB 
also serves as a point of complaint for project-affected people who believe they have 
received compensation inadequate to restore their lost economic and social bases. In 
response to reported problems, ADB can facilitate meetings between concerned 
stakeholders, request a resettlement audit to determine the validity of complaints, and work 
with the governments concerned to resolve outstanding issues.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Cross-border energy projects not only cut the costs of energy supplies, but also provide local 
and global environmental benefits by reducing local pollutants and greenhouse gas 
emissions through the use of hydropower and/or natural gas in place of coal and/or oil. 
Cross-border transport (highway) projects cut vehicle operating costs and improve traffic 
safety, and at the same time increase the passage of goods across borders. In addition to 
these measurable economic and environmental benefits, intangible benefits such as the 
strengthening of both energy security and regional economic cooperation with neighboring 
countries may also be generated by cross-border energy and transport projects.  
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Along with positive benefits, cross-border infrastructure projects can also have potentially 
negative environmental impacts. Many of these negative environmental impacts, including 
climate impacts, will occur during project construction, whereas some environmental impacts 
will occur and be known only during project operation. So project developers need to be able 
to both anticipate environmental impacts during project preparation and deal with 
environmental effects during project operation. Depending on its scale, type, and location, a 
cross-border infrastructure project can have environmental impacts that extend beyond the 
project level and into the national, subregional, or even global level. Thus, environmental 
impacts both at the project level and, wherever necessary, beyond the project level need to 
be taken into account. The adverse impacts identified then need to be avoided to the extent 
possible, or reduced to a minimum or acceptable level in cases where they can not be 
completely avoided.  
An important lesson learned from the assessment of completed cross-border projects is that 
carefully investigating project alternatives at the project design stage, and making the 
corresponding modifications wherever needed, can act as a mitigation measure to help to 
reduce the negative impacts of the proposed project. A study of alternatives helps to achieve 
that goal by first determining how the project in question compares with alternative options 
for the same goal as measured against technical, economic, financial, environmental, and 
social criteria, and then examining whether the proposed configuration of the project is 
optimal. Other mitigation measures that can be applied during the project design stage 
include the careful selection of project sites and routes to avoid their being located in 
sensitive areas, reduction of the number of camp followers, the development and 
implementation of a proper contract-awarding system, specification of the green credentials 
required of head construction contractors, and engagement with project-affected people and 
communities and other concerned stakeholders in public consultation and disclosure 
processes in order to determine proper compensation and resettlement settlements and 
plans. 
  Cross-border projects also face additional challenges relative to national projects. 
Technical, regulatory, institutional, and legal obstacles can constrain the development of 
cross-border infrastructure projects. The countries concerned need to agree in detail to 
technical specifications and develop harmonized standards for design, construction, 
operation, maintenance, health, safety and environment, and weights and measures, in 
order to mitigate environmental risks and impacts. Arrangements for pricing, tariffs, and 
access and use are especially critical, because under-pricing in receiving markets, excessive 
transit and user fees, restrictions on or unfavorable transmission of transit access, unclear 
interconnection requirements, and excessive liability insurance requirements can all obstruct 
the development of cross-border infrastructure projects. 
Cross-border projects can also be hampered by a state’s politically-motivated reluctance to 
become dependent on another country for energy, for reasons of security of energy supply, 
or to export what is viewed as a strategic national asset. Therefore, governments need to 
move towards a market-based pricing system and away from practices such as price 
interventions and tax distortions, which lead to the inefficient pricing of natural gas or power. 
For wider power grid or pipeline interconnections, more formal arrangements are necessary 
to provide participants with sufficient assurances on matters such as system operation, 
pricing or tariffs, transmission or transit access, and fees. The Northeast Asia (NEA) and 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries could take the relevant article 
under the Energy Charter Treaty as a reference for dealing with access and use issues and 
setting transit tariffs. With the GMS Inter-Governmental Agreement on Regional Power 
Trade as a base and the Regional Electricity Regulatory Authority in Southern Africa as an 
interesting example, this subregion could explore the possibility of establishing a structured 
subregional regulatory regime for power interconnections and operation.  
Institutional arrangements, either formal or informal, are crucial to the success of cross-
border infrastructure projects. The specific institutional arrangements required will vary 
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depending on the project type, and the level of arrangement will range from the project level 
to the national level and higher. At the project level, the asymmetric distribution of costs and 
benefits among the parties involved needs to be addressed, in order to align the costs with 
the benefits of the main parties. Given that a cross-border project has several country 
components, there is a clear need to coordinate arrangements among parties to ensure the 
overall sustainability the project. To integrate regional infrastructure projects with national 
plans and priorities, national institutional capacities need to be strengthened in order to 
develop a good understanding of domestic infrastructure programs, priorities, and resources, 
and the potential domestic benefits of cross-border infrastructure projects. Moreover, there 
should be a clear delineation of responsibility and accountability, and good coordination 
across ministries and concerned authorities. Regional institutional frameworks or 
arrangements are also crucial to effective cooperation on cross-border energy projects. The 
highly collaborative planning process for the ASEAN Power Grid project, clearly backed by 
governments and supported by power system experts, is a valuable model. A similar 
process with political backing is needed in NEA in order to achieve sufficient support for the 
proposed power grid interconnection. The governments of the NEA could go further and 
explore the possibility of establishing a formal regional institutional framework for energy 
cooperation, with a common set of  rules and an obligation on the countries involved to 
observe these rules in practice.  
The environmental impact assessment (EIA) legislation in the region generally suffers from 
inadequacies in: setting out institutional responsibilities at different stages of the process; 
coverage; requirements and guidelines for impact assessments for projects of different 
scales; and articulation of enforcement procedures. The EIA laws are often vague with 
regard to the credentials required and the scope of various agencies involved in EIAs. Thus, 
there is a clear need to establish additional measures that define the requisite credentials for 
agencies undertaking EIAs on construction projects. The implementation of completed EIAs 
has also been a big issue in the region. Further, EIAs have in general tended to 
underestimate both the environmental and social impacts of proposed projects and their 
mitigation costs. Moreover, some cross-border infrastructure projects require a strategic 
impact assessment (SIA) to be undertaken in order to identify both potential impacts 
extending beyond the project level and the options available to avoid or mitigate these 
impacts. However, current environmental assessment legislation in many Asian countries 
does not contain SIA provisions. So, even if externally-funded projects have been subject to 
a proper SIA, national governments may not have to commit to its implementation because it 
is not mandated under domestic legislation. Even where current environmental assessment 
legislation does contain SIA provisions, these provisions are too general to be of any real 
practical use. For example, they do not specify what kinds of projects require mandatory SIA 
reports, nor do they specify approval procedures for SIA reports once prepared. In these 
cases, detailed regulations need to be established to render the SIA provisions fully 
operational.  
Cross-border infrastructure investments are highly capital intensive, and involve fixed 
infrastructure formation and long project cycles with long payback periods. These 
characteristics make a stable legal framework especially important for cross-border 
infrastructure investments. Thus, it is imperative to have the right legal frameworks in place. 
Equally importantly, there should be streamlined and transparent procedures, sound 
governance, and clearer lines of responsibility and function at the various levels of 
government.  
Finally, it should be stressed that ADB’s role as an external sponsor, serving as a 
disinterested honest broker, catalyst, source of assistance (both technical and financial), and 
mobilizer of external resources, has been an important factor contributing to the success of 
the GMS cooperation on cross-border infrastructure planning and development. The 
multilateral development banks, like ADB, need to continue to play these multiple roles. In 
the context of EIAs, ADB has played and needs to continue to play a role in building 
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capacities for the formulation, implementation, and monitoring of EIAs, cumulative impact 
assessments, SIAs, and environmental management plans. The involvement of ADB also 
helps to avoid the underestimation of compensation and resettlement needs, as well as 
insufficient planning and budgeting for those needs. Moreover, ADB serves as a point of 
complaint for project-affected people, and in response to reported problems, ADB can 
facilitate meetings between concerned stakeholders, request a resettlement audit to 
determine the validity of complaints, and work with the governments concerned to resolve 
outstanding issues.  
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